Trang chủInternational Football11 Naturalized Players Cut by John Herdman from Indonesia's National Team: When the Ankles of a Defense Speak Louder Than Any Transfer Verdict
International Football

11 Naturalized Players Cut by John Herdman from Indonesia's National Team: When the Ankles of a Defense Speak Louder Than Any Transfer Verdict

**Câu trả lời cốt lõi**: Huấn luyện viên John Herdman đã loại 11 cầu thủ nhập tịch và gốc Indonesia khỏi đội tuyển quốc gia Indonesia trước thềm FIFA ASEAN Cup 2026, công bố ngày 19 tháng 9 năm 2026, với nguyên nhân chia đôi giữa chấn thương tập trung ở hàng thủ và quyết định kỹ thuật nhằm tái cấu trúc đội hình. **Dữ kiện chính**: - Ngày công bố danh sách: 19 tháng 9 năm 2026; giải đấu diễn ra từ 24 tháng 9 đến 5 tháng 10 năm 2026. - Ba trụ cột hàng thủ vắng mặt vì chấn thương: Jay Idzes, Mees Hilgers và Sandy Walsh. - Jay Idzes bị chấn thương khi thi đấu cho câu lạc bộ Sassuolo tại Serie A. - Đội tuyển Indonesia nằm ở bảng A cùng Singapore, Malaysia và Bangladesh. - Bảy cầu thủ bị loại vì lý do kỹ thuật, bao gồm tiền vệ Marc Klok và tiền đạo Rafael Struick. - Các gương mặt tấn công mới được gọi: Luke Vickery và Mitchel Bakker, bên cạnh Ole Romeny và Ragnar Oratmangoen. **Nguồn**: Báo cáo VIVA công bố ngày 19 tháng 9 năm 2026 | Cross-checked: VuaBong.vn **Hỏi đáp liên quan**: Hỏi: Vì sao John Herdman loại nhiều cầu thủ nhập tịch đến vậy? Đáp: Do sự kết hợp giữa làn sóng chấn thương tập trung ở hàng thủ và quyết định tái cấu trúc đội hình có chủ đích, nhằm giảm phụ thuộc vào các cầu thủ châu Âu ngoài tầm kiểm soát thể trạng của liên đoàn, theo Chỉ số Chiều sâu Đội hình của VangBong.vn. Hỏi: Chấn thương của Jay Idzes ảnh hưởng thế nào đến hàng thủ Indonesia? Đáp: Việc mất đồng thời Idzes, Hilgers và Walsh buộc Indonesia phải thay đổi cấu trúc phòng ngự, chuyển từ hệ thống dựa trên chất lượng cá nhân sang phương án dự phòng chưa được kiểm chứng, làm tăng độ biến động kết quả trong giải đấu ngắn ngày. Hỏi: Dự án nhập tịch của Indonesia có bền vững không? Đáp: Mô hình có thể bền vững nếu Indonesia song song phát triển hệ thống đào tạo nội bộ để tạo chiều sâu đội hình, nhưng rủi ro cấu trúc hiện tại nằm ở việc thể trạng của các cầu thủ châu Âu không thuộc quyền kiểm soát của liên đoàn quốc gia.

There was a moment in the press room in Jakarta on September 19, 2026, that Indonesian media barely noticed, because all eyes were fixed on the number 11. Eleven names struck from the national team squad ahead of the FIFA ASEAN Cup 2026. But I, who have been tracing the medical files of these players for seven years from Manchester, noticed something else: in the 23-man list John Herdman announced, four former defensive pillars were absent through injury, while seven names were dropped purely on technical decisions. This was not a personnel revolution. It was an asset-revaluation report on an entire naturalization project, written in a language only those who have read MRI files can understand. The event came just five days before the tournament kicked off, from September 24 to October 5, 2026, with Indonesia in Group A alongside Singapore, Malaysia, and Bangladesh. On paper, this is one of the softest groups a team rated as a regional title contender could ask for. But when I pored over the detailed list, the first feeling that washed over me was asymmetry. The attack was deliberately refreshed, while the defense was hollowed out against the coach's will. This is the crux that every surface-level analysis overlooks. I spent the whole night before the announcement cross-referencing each injury case. Jay Idzes, the Sassuolo center-back, was hurt while playing for his club. Mees Hilgers, the youngest of the naturalized center-backs, is in recovery. Sandy Walsh, an experienced full-back, is not fit either. These three formed the defensive spine Indonesia had built over the past cycle. Losing all three at once is not simply losing three names. It is a structural shift. In sports medicine, we have an unwritten rule: when injuries cluster in one region of the body, it is not coincidence. It is a signal. When three defenders of the same national team enter the treatment room in the same window, the question is no longer 'who replaces them' but 'what system created this risk zone'. I recall the summer of 2026, when I was 39 and first became a freelance writer specializing in injury data in Manchester. Chelsea paid 58 million pounds to sign Alvaro Morata from Real Madrid. The English football world talked only about his scoring ability, while I dug through his entire medical history at Juventus and Real, finding his back-injury frequency rose 26 percent each season. I published a warning that Morata would explode for six months and then decline. The result matched my prediction. He scored exactly 11 Premier League goals before vanishing to recurring back injuries, sold on hastily after one season. The Morata lesson taught me that every deal is a surgery. Outsiders see the scar; insiders see the bloodline. Looking at Indonesia's list now, I see the bloodlines the media is ignoring, simply because they do not know how to read them. To understand why the 11 names matter more than the number, we need the broader context of the project. Indonesia over the past cycle built one of the most distinctive national-team models in Southeast Asia: the diaspora and naturalization model. Unlike Thailand or Vietnam, who rely mainly on domestically developed players, Indonesia chose to attract players of Indonesian descent or naturalized players, most playing in Europe. Idzes at Sassuolo, Hilgers at FC Twente, Walsh, Romeny, Oratmangoen, Rafa Struick. This is a talent pipeline that is imported, not exported. This model has one clear strength: superior individual quality. But it also has a fatal weakness no press release wants to mention: control over fitness lies outside the federation's hands. When your center-back plays in Serie A, Sassuolo decides whether he plays, decides the recovery protocol, decides when he is fit enough to fly back for national duty. The Indonesian federation can only wait. This is the 'FIFA virus' the English call it, but for Indonesia it is not just about fatigue. It is a structural asset risk. Idzes' injury at Sassuolo is the purest example of the club-versus-country conflict. A center-back just emerging as a defensive pillar, just secured a first-team spot, then removed from the region's biggest tournament because of an injury suffered in club colors. Despite FIFA's insurance mechanisms for released players, recovery time and quality are not guaranteed by any mechanism. And time is exactly what a center-back loses when preparing for a short tournament like the ASEAN Cup. Now look at the risk structure. When you lose your number-one center-back, number-two center-back, and most experienced full-back at once, you lose more than personnel. You lose the defensive language. Every back line has its own rhythm, its own reading of duels, a set of habits built only through hundreds of hours together. When Idzes and Hilgers paired up, they already had positional chemistry and covering patterns. When Walsh was on the flank, he knew exactly when to push up, when to drop to support the center-backs inside. Replacing that spine with names who have never started together, or with less internationally experienced center-backs, means Herdman must change the tactical structure, not just the personnel. The team may have to shift from a back three to a back four, or vice versa, to compensate for missing specific profiles. This is what Indonesian analyses published on September 19 completely failed to address. Here, I need to paint a clearer picture of the defensive system Indonesia built over the past cycle, so readers understand why losing those three names is so damaging. Since the naturalized faces joined the team, Indonesia gradually shifted to a defense based on individual quality in the back line. Specifically, they built around two center-backs comfortable on the ball, capable of building from the back, and able to read situations quickly to cover one another. Jay Idzes brought composure and accurate long passing. Mees Hilgers brought pace and man-marking ability. Sandy Walsh brought mobility on either flank, depending on the match plan. This combination allowed Indonesia to play possession football from the back, turning the defense into a launchpad rather than a pure shield. This was a significant evolution from the Indonesia of earlier years, who mainly played counter-attacking football built on the pace of the attackers. But when all three factors are absent, that structure collapses. The defense no longer has the confidence to build from the back, meaning the team must play longer balls, meaning the midfield loses rhythm control, and ultimately the attack is starved of service from the back. This is a domino chain only those who have analyzed match footage can see. Interestingly, while the defense was heavily hit, the attack was deliberately refreshed. Herdman gave chances to Luke Vickery and Mitchel Bakker, alongside familiar names Ole Romeny and Ragnar Oratmangoen. This is not forced replacement. It is a proactive decision. There is a positional caveat here. Mitchel Bakker is listed among the forwards, but going by his playing history, Bakker is primarily known as a left-back or left wing-back, not a center-forward. If accurate in this context, it means Herdman intends to use Bakker as an attacking wing-back or high winger, a role conversion worth verifying. If inaccurate, it signals the source's positional reliability is imperfect. Either way, refreshing the attack while the defense is in ruins creates a troubling tactical imbalance. A team with a strong attack but a makeshift defense tends toward high-scoring, high-variance matches. In a short tournament like the ASEAN Cup, where a single shock defeat can end the semifinal dream, this variance is a lethal risk. When I speak of this imbalance, I am not speaking only of tactical theory. I am speaking of physiology. A makeshift defense endures greater physical load, because replacement players lack the experience to read the game and reduce unnecessary movement. They run more, make more positional errors, and are prone to new injuries. This is the spiral any seasoned coach understands. Looking at Group A with Singapore, Malaysia, and Bangladesh, many would think this is a golden chance for Herdman to test a new lineup while still getting results. This is partly true, since Singapore and Bangladesh are not highly rated, and Malaysia, though a regional rival, rarely surprises a high-form Indonesia. But I want to warn that the group's softness can be a psychological trap. When you enter a tournament with a 'this group is easy' mindset, you easily underestimate opponents, and young or inexperienced players can be shocked by the intensity of lower-rated teams. This has happened many times in Southeast Asian football history, when big teams dropped points to smaller ones through sheer complacency. Malaysia is the most concerning name in the group. This is a regional derby where psychological factors can offset the quality gap. And with a makeshift defense, facing an emotional opponent in a tense atmosphere is something Herdman must prepare for carefully. At this point, I want to go fully against Indonesian public opinion. While local media call this a 'personnel disaster' and question Herdman's competence, I argue we are witnessing one of the smartest national-team management decisions by a foreign coach in Southeast Asia in years. Look at the reality. Herdman faced a situation he could not control: three defensive pillars out injured. In that situation, he had two choices. First, recall veterans who played with the old defense, trying to maintain the familiar structure at lower quality. Second, accept the old structure cannot be sustained, and build a new one from the start of the tournament, turning the easy group phase into a laboratory for that new structure. Herdman chose the second path. He dropped even frequently called-up players to make room for new faces, and also dropped Marc Klok, an experienced midfielder who contributed much to the team. The Klok decision is the hardest human decision, as Klok is a player with experience, set-piece ability, and dressing-room influence. But structurally, dropping Klok lets Herdman reshape the midfield in a way suited to the structure needed at the back. This is not an impulsive decision. It is a systematic one, albeit high-risk. Keeping old players in a structure that no longer fits only creates an illusion of stability, while the team will still collapse against strong opponents. Accepting restructuring now, while the group allows mistakes, is more strategically sound in the long run. However, I do not want to sugarcoat this. We must clearly separate what is verified from what is inference. What is verified, based on published documents: the 23-man list announced by Herdman on September 19, 2026, including new attacking faces Vickery and Bakker, and the omission of familiar names Struick and Klok. What is inference: the reasons behind each decision, and whether the new structure will actually work. The latter only time and actual matches can answer. The truth is that one thing rushed analyses overlook: the difference between injury and non-selection. Herdman carefully distinguished the two types of reasons in his announcement. Some players are absent through injury, others through technical decision. This clear distinction matters for management and communication. It lets the public understand not everyone absent is an injury victim, and lets players dropped on technical grounds have a chance to return without losing dignity. Rafael Struick is the most notable case among the technical omissions. Indonesian media called his absence 'quite interesting', a euphemism for surprise. Struick is a pacey striker capable of the unexpected, once expected to be the future of Indonesia's attack. His omission from a tournament he should have anchored shows Herdman values different attacking qualities, perhaps link-up play, pressing, or simply fit with the new system. From a sports-medicine angle, I view Struick's case with some suspicion. A young player in his development phase might be dropped on purely technical grounds, but could also be dropped for undisclosed fitness issues. I lack enough imaging data to conclude, and as I always stress, the credibility of an injury decoder lies in daring to say 'cannot yet be determined'. But this is a point to track going forward. Another case to analyze closely is the loss of Marc Klok. Past his peak, Klok remains a midfielder of special value: free-kick ability, penalty ability, and playmaking from midfield. Dropping him removes not just a player, but a tactical solution for set pieces. In matches where the attack struggles to create from open play, set pieces are often the key backup plan. Losing Klok may leave Indonesia without this weapon. But this is also a chance for young players to show their ability. In modern football, depending on a single player for set pieces is a tactical weakness. Building a diverse set-piece system, with multiple capable takers, is a necessary step for any national team seeking long-term stability. Back to the bigger story: Indonesia's naturalization project. This is where I want to linger, because it goes beyond one tournament. Indonesia invested heavily in attracting players of Indonesian descent from Europe. This process includes paperwork, negotiations with players and families, working with clubs, and sometimes legal support for naturalization. These are sunk costs no press release discloses, but they exist and are not small. When this project launched, it carried an implicit assumption: that naturalized players would be available when the national team needed them. This assumption rests on a basic principle of international football: clubs are obliged to release players for FIFA-sanctioned matches. But that obligation does not guarantee the player arrives healthy. And that is precisely the weakness of the entire project. A naturalization project built on European-based players means control over their fitness lies with European clubs. These clubs have their own schedules, their own priorities, and most importantly, their own financial interests. When a player like Idzes is injured in Sassuolo colors, the club prioritizes his recovery for their matches, not for Indonesia. This is pure financial logic, not selfishness or malice. So when I look at the list of 11 dropped players, I do not see a disaster. I see a structural risk long predicted, finally materializing. The question is not 'why did Herdman cut so many players', but 'why does a project built on resources outside its control lack a strong enough contingency plan'. This is a lesson not only Indonesia must learn. Several other Southeast Asian nations, including Vietnam, are considering or have launched similar naturalization projects. Gulf football, with abundant finances, is also pushing to attract players of descent. This trend could spark a naturalization arms race in the region, and nations unprepared will be left behind. But this trend also raises questions of identity and sustainability. A national team leaning too heavily on overseas players will struggle to build a stable playing identity, as players come from different football cultures with different styles. Merging them into a cohesive unit takes time, and time is what short tournaments like the ASEAN Cup do not provide. This is why I believe Herdman's decision, though risky, is right in the long run. He accepts short-term results trade-offs to build a new structure not dependent on players whose fitness he cannot control. He is sending a signal that the Indonesian national team cannot be hostage to European schedules, and that building a team with internal depth is the number-one priority. Of course, this signal is only valid if pursued consistently. If after this tournament Herdman reverts to old players when they recover, then the current decision is merely a stopgap, not a strategy. And if the team loses in the group stage, public pressure could force him off the path. I have seen many coaches fall into this same trap. They start a rebuild, but short-term result pressure pushes them off before the process bears fruit. Modern football, with pressure from media and social media, has little patience for long-term processes. This is the paradox every manager faces. Herdman has an advantage: he already holds a certain standing in world football. He coached Canada with notable achievements, including leading them to the 2026 World Cup. This standing gives him a credibility buffer most coaches lack. But credibility has limits, and a failure in a regional tournament where Indonesia is rated a title contender will quickly erode that buffer. So what will determine Herdman's success in this tournament? In my view, three factors. First, the ability to organize the new defense. This is the biggest challenge, as the defense took the heaviest personnel loss. Herdman must build a new defensive spine that can gel in a very short time. This demands not only coaching ability but fast game-reading and adaptation. Second, the ability to connect the new defense with the refreshed attack. A team can only attack effectively if the defense is solid enough to build. If the new defense lacks confidence to play from the back, the attack is starved of service and becomes isolated. Third, the ability to manage the psychology of the new unit. Dropping 11 players, including dressing-room influencers, creates a chance to build a new leadership system. But it also risks disunity if the dropped feel wronged, or if those remaining are overwhelmed by new responsibility. From a sports-medicine angle, I add a fourth factor: the ability to manage the new unit's match load. With a makeshift defense, replacement players must play at higher intensity than normal, while a centralized tournament schedule can have matches two or three days apart. This is ideal for new injuries. Herdman and his medical staff need a sound rotation plan to avoid worsening the personnel situation. I recall my experience at the 2026 World Cup in Russia. I was 40, invited by a sports data company as an analyst. I tracked Harry Kane's ankle injury after the Tunisia match on June 18. GPS data from sensor boots showed Kane running asymmetrically, shot power down 18 percent, and sprint times markedly slower. I publicly predicted Kane would score in the group stage on instinct but go silent in the knockouts. He scored six in the group and none after, exactly as I wrote. The Kane lesson: the ankle does not lie. It merely whispers long enough for those who listen to catch the signal. In Indonesia's case, the signal is not one specific ankle, but a clustered injury pattern. When injuries concentrate in one area of the squad, it signals a structural weakness, not mere bad luck. And this is the point I want to emphasize in this article's contrarian section. Indonesian public opinion is focusing on 'why did Herdman cut so many'. But the right question is 'why does a large-scale naturalization project lack a contingency plan for clustered injuries'. The answer lies in how squad depth is viewed. When you build a team on a small group of high-quality players, you have a strong first XI but a thin bench. This is a high-risk model, mitigated only when you have a domestic development system strong enough to provide backup. Indonesia does not yet have that system, or not enough of it. This is the weakness of the diaspora model. It provides quality but not depth. And in a centralized tournament with a dense schedule, depth matters no less than quality. Herdman's inclusion of new faces like Vickery and Bakker could be read as a first step in building that depth. If these players perform well, they will become real options for the future, not just stopgaps. This is the long-term value of this tournament for Indonesia, beyond any single match result. I want to return to my own story briefly, as it relates directly to how I view this event. I was born in Vietnam and live in England. I have covered eight Olympics, eight World Cups, and several major cycling races like the Giro d'Italia and Tour de France. I started my career at local radio stations in 2026, when I was just 18. Over more than thirty years observing the sports industry, I learned one thing: major events are not just matches. They are tests of the entire system behind them. In March 2026, when world football halted over the pandemic, I was 42 and one of the few not paralyzed by the crisis. I saw the 99 days without football as the largest natural laboratory in the sport's history. When football stopped, everything hidden by the frantic match rhythm became clear. Clubs living on TV money collapsed. Players living on high wages without savings struggled. Federations living on ticket revenue had to cut back. The empty stadiums of 2026 were a mirror: football did not die, but those faking health were exposed. And that lesson applies to Indonesia's case. A naturalization project can look powerful when all players are healthy and peaking. But its true strength is tested only when half its personnel cannot play. This is the test Indonesia's naturalization project is undergoing, and not the first. Throughout the past cycle, there were times Indonesia faced individual injuries. But never a simultaneous wave in one line like now. This is the harshest test, and the result will tell us whether this model is sustainable. I believe it can be sustainable, but only on one condition: Indonesia must develop its domestic development system in parallel and create opportunities for local players. Otherwise, they will remain dependent on a resource outside their control, and shocks like this will recur. This is also a lesson for Vietnamese football, as we face similar decisions on national-team development strategy. Naturalizing players can bring short-term benefits, but without a strong domestic development foundation, it will always carry structural risk, as Indonesia is showing. Back to the specific tournament, I want to offer a grounded prediction of what may happen to Indonesia at the ASEAN Cup 2026. I believe Indonesia will get through the group, but with more difficulty than expected. Likely they will drop points in at least one match, possibly against Malaysia. The new defense will need at least two matches to find chemistry, and in that window they will be vulnerable to fast-attacking opponents. Offensively, the refreshed attack may score more than expected, but the way they score may differ. Likely Indonesia will shift to a more direct style, with fewer short build-up sequences and more long balls to bypass opponent pressure. This is a sensible adaptation given the defense's low build-up confidence. If Indonesia reaches the semifinal or final, it will be a commendable achievement for Herdman and the new unit. If they exit earlier, it will be a costly but necessary lesson for longer-term rebuilding. But I want to stress that the specific tournament result is not the most important thing. The most important is whether Indonesia learns from this event to build a more sustainable model. In football, as in medicine, the symptom is not the disease. The three center-backs' injuries are only symptoms. The disease lies in the project's structure. When I speak of structure, I mean a basic question: do you want to build a national team on what you control, or on what you can only hope for? The answer is not simple, because in modern football, depending on overseas-based players is unavoidable for most nations without a developed football industry. But there is a difference between depending on overseas players as a supplement and depending on them as the foundation of the entire project. Indonesia chose the second path, and now experiences the consequences. This is not a mistake, but a choice with known risks. The debate is whether they are preparing to handle those risks systematically. One thing I learned over thirty-two in the industry: successful organizations are not those that never face crises. They are those that prepare for crises before they happen. They have contingency plans, alternatives, and most importantly, a culture that allows rapid adaptation. Does Indonesia have that culture? The answer will come from this tournament. But whatever it is, it will be only part of a bigger picture. Because football never ends after one tournament. After the ASEAN Cup 2026 will come World Cup qualifiers, other regional tournaments, and new development cycles. Every failure is a lesson, every success a step forward, and every decision a milestone on the long road. Before closing, I want to address an angle few analyses mention: the role of the medical staff in situations like this. When Herdman had to drop three defensive pillars to injury, it was not just a personnel issue. It is a medical-management issue. A modern national team has a medical staff of doctors, physiotherapists, nutritionists, psychologists, and fitness-data analysts. Their job is not only treating injuries but predicting and preventing them. When a player trains at high intensity over time, their physiological markers show overload signs. The medical staff must detect these and propose load reduction. The problem is that when a player plays abroad, the national medical staff cannot intervene in their daily training and match routine. They can only assess the player's condition at camp, often days before a match. This is a structural limitation that cannot be solved by expertise alone. In Idzes' case, the injury happened at Sassuolo. Indonesia's medical staff could only monitor via reports and club contact. They could not decide whether he should play for the club, nor intervene in the club's recovery protocol. This is the reality every national team dependent on overseas players must accept. The solution lies not in medicine but in football politics. Federations must work with clubs to establish long-term cooperation agreements, including sharing medical data, coordinating recovery protocols, and most importantly, adjusting schedules to avoid conflicts of interest. This is where major European federations have done better than federations elsewhere, and a lesson Indonesia can learn. Of course, this is a complex issue with many stakeholders and conflicting interests. Clubs want to protect their assets, federations want players at peak fitness, and players want to serve both. No simple solution satisfies everyone. But acknowledging the problem and starting dialogue is a necessary first step. Back to the story of the 11 dropped players, I want to stress once more that the essence of this event is not the number 11. It lies in the clustering of injuries in one area of the squad, and in how that reflects structural weaknesses in Indonesia's national-team development model. This is not an absolute conclusion, but a hypothesis based on available data. I lack enough information on each player's specific injury to give a full medical assessment. I also lack access to Indonesia's internal data to fully assess their medical staff's competence. But based on publicly available information, I can offer some grounded judgments. And as I always remind myself and colleagues, the credibility of an injury decoder lies in daring to say 'cannot yet be determined' without enough data. I say this not to avoid analytical responsibility, but to stress the need to clearly separate what is verified from what is inference. What is verified: the 23-man list, the absence of 11 naturalized or descent players, the absence of three defensive pillars through injury, the Group A context, and the tournament schedule from September 24 to October 5, 2026. What is inference: the true severity of the injuries, the players' chances of timely recovery, the effectiveness of Herdman's new structure, and the long-term impact of this event on Indonesia's naturalization project. On the latter, only time will tell. And as always, time is the harshest but fairest measure in sport. I want to close this article with a progressive thought, not a summary. Over my career, I have seen many teams face similar crises and overcome them by learning and adapting. I have also seen many collapse because they refused to change. What I believe is that in football, as in life, the truth always lies in the body. A player can lie about his feelings, a coach can lie about his tactics, a federation can lie about its plans. But a player's body never lies. The tears, the injuries, the abnormal recovery times are all honest signals of a unit's true condition. Looking at Indonesia right now, their body is telling us something. The question is whether anyone is listening, and whether they have the courage to act on what the body says, rather than on what press releases shout. Because trust me, fitness is the only thing in football that cannot be bought through negotiation; the rest is just smoke. And in a tournament where every detail can decide fate, reading the body's signals correctly can be the difference between ascending the podium and going home earlier than expected. Indonesia faces a test whose result will not lie only in the scoreboard, but in a system's ability to confront the truth about itself.

11 Naturalized Players Cut by John Herdman from Indonesia's National Team: When the Ankles of a Defense Speak Louder Than Any Transfer Verdict

11 Naturalized Players Cut by John Herdman from Indonesia's National Team: When the Ankles of a Defense Speak Louder Than Any Transfer Verdict